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THE CHANGING FAMILY AND FAMILY POLICY
Ronald J. Mancoske
Doctoral Student University of Alabama

ABSTRACT
The concern for the loss of family functions ii, the process of
social change has led some to call for a family policy to support
the family to cope with stress in meeting its basic functions.
Change in functioning of the family is inclusive of various spheres:
economic, status giving, educational, religious, recreational, protective and affectional. These changes are seen as indicative of
the decline in the family. This view is moderated by the spectrum
of change in the family interactions. Support for family policy
is essential though it can not be developed on the idea of the
perilous decline in the family due to a loss of its functions.

"All our lives long, every day and every hour, we are engaged
in the process of accomodating our changed and unchanged selves to
changed and unchanged surroundings; living, in fact, is nothing
else but this process of accomodation; when we fail in it a little,
we are stupid, when we fail flagrantly, we are mad, when we suspend it temporarily, we sleep, when we give up the attempt altogether, we die". Samuel Butler

The Changing Family and Family Policy
There are many who advocate for a national family policy to
support the family in the performance of its basic functions during
times of social change. The recent White House Conference on Families brought diverse groups together to advance their interests.
The family is seen to be struggling in meeting its basic functions
because of change and lack of support (Pardeck, 1979).
There is a
gap between social change and family policies in the United States
as compared to various European countries indicative of unmet
need (Kahn, Kamerman, 1975). A recent lead editorial in Social
Work calls for a basis for the development of family policy to be
incrementally initiated and decentralized (Gilbert, 1979).
The theoretical basis in which many advocate a family policy
derives assumptions of the loss of family functions. The following
will address this theory in light of the classic sociological report of William Ogburn called "The Family and Its Functions"
(1933), compare it with other more current research, and relate
these findings to the process of the development of support for
family policy. There is a loss of family functions but the loss
is moderate and ideas of perilous decline in family functioning
are not supportable and thus policy can not be developed from this
vantage point.
Ogburn's classic report on the family and its functions came
to two major conclusions--one being a decline in the institutional
functions of the family and the second is the resulting predominant importance of the family in the development of personality
functioning. It is important to note that when discussing the
family, we are talking of a general phenomenon--one which is not
monolithic but varying according to race, lifestyle, geographics,
culture and attitudes. The major focus of this paper will be on

the loss of functions which Ogburn outlines: economic, status giving, education, religious, recreational, protective and affectional.
It will emphasize the economic, as did Ogburn and his critics.
Loss of Functions
Economic
The loss of economic functions of the family was given more
attention in Ogburn's report than the loss of the other functions.
He studied the transfer from the home of labor such as baking,
sewing, laundrying, and some cleaning. These features reduced the
economic importance of women in the home and set the trend for
women to seek employment outside the home. He looked at other data
to buttress this loss, such as the types of dwellings one lives in,
size of space, use of home energy and time spent at household work.
He compared changes as well between urban and rural living finding
a unanimous decline.
In a later work, the focus of loss of economic functions by
the family took a more central role (Ogburn and Nimkoff, 1955).
They viewed technological changes as causing family changes. The
effects do not always occur simultaneously and at times a cultural
lag develops, especially when causes are remote and change dispersed.
Ogburn and Nimkoff saw the loss of economic functions by the
family as leading to the gradual emergence of romantic marriage.
The decline in economic functions of women in the home is traceable
to technological developments. They linked changes in family
patterns to these causes. For example, they cite age at marriage,
size of family, changing male and female roles and relationship
changes as indicative of this. This was seen as causing family
decline. It was not argued that technological change was the sole
cause of family change, only a major one.

In a historical study of change and the family in nineteenth
century England, Smelser (1959) studied the impact of technological
change on the family structure also. Change in technology was
viewed as it changed the extended family to the nuclear family and
built an ideology to accompany this. This trend in thought was
descriptive of the weakening of the family. The loss of old norms
was seen not as leading to the development of new ones but as
social disorganization and chaos. The extended family does not fit
with the demands of industrial society and thus is replaced with
the evolution of the nuclear family arrangement. The nuclear
family "fit" with industrialism is more compatible.
Industrialization and family change can be seen as variables
which are interactive (Goode, 1969).
Changes in women's roles such
as by the introduction of labor saving devices interact with other
variables which in combination have different sorts of casual
implications. In an earlier article, Goode (1968) states that not
only does industrialism change the family but the family also has
the capacity to change the nature of industrialism and thus is
potentially adaptive and not disorganizing. Goode labels the
"classical family of Western nostalgia" as the perpetuation of myths
about an ideal extended family. This relates to the fact that
changes in the family occurred before industrialization; the relations between the family and technology are not linearly cause and
effect. For example, ideological change in China was encouraged to
alter family forms in order to facilitate modernization. The
ideology was the factor enducing change in family structure while
interacting with other factors in the change dynamics.
Furstenberg (1969) follows along a similar vein when he asserts
that change in the American family has been exaggerated and changes
from an extended family to a nuclear family began occurring before
industrialization. He also notes that features of disorganization

were amply evident before industrialization--such as child abandonment, lack of discipline of children, a dislike for domesticity,
and others. Some features of strain in the family existed before
industrialization, others were intensified by it, and some resulted
from changes incurred by adaptations to industrialization.
These adaptive functions of the family posit that there is
actually not a loss of economic functions but a change of form
(Vincent, 1969). As Ogburn's study fit a stereotyped image, it was
popularly accepted. The economic function of the family, however,
shifted from production centered in the home to consumption centered
in the home--a function of not less significance though of a very
different character (Goode, 1968).
The current economy depends on
consumption patterns in which the family plays a critical role.
Cross cultural studies also refute Ogburn's thesis of the loss
of functions of the family causing a breakdown as seen in the decline
of the extended family. The reports note the exceptions in the
modernization of Brazil, as well as maintenance of the extended
family patterns in Japan and China after modernization (Levy, 1964).
Other research details the disorganization of the nuclear family
found in Barbados despite the lack of technological changes (Greenfield, 1961). This concludes that the evidence does not support the
Ogburn thesis and suggests the importance of other interacting
historical and ideological features. Nisbet offers similar evidence
in his study of the decline of patriarchal ideology in the Roman
epoch (1972).
Seward studied the American family since colonial days and
concludes that the idea of the great change in the family due to a
loss of functions is a myth. He maintains the family has held a
high level of structural integrity and that external pressures due
to economic changes have not caused much change in the family at
all (1978).

Seward describes the Ogburn and later Ogburn and Nimkoff and
also Smelser thesis as a romantic notion based in part on a rural
nostalgia and in part on a thin base of data which is borrowed back
and forth with compounding inaccuracies. The economic limitations
of pre-industrial society precluded the widespread existance of
extended families to all but the very wealthy. The data shows a
common pattern from pre-industrial colonial society across time to
current society in various features:
size of family membership,
ages of members, sex composition, generational composition, number
of marital pairs and number of siblings. This data will be reviewed
later when discussing further trends.
Ogburn and Nimkoff acknowledge the importance of other features
which can also contribute to changes in the family. They talk of
ideologic change as one important feature--what they call new
psychology/humanism. This is in contradistinction to economic determinism. Engles (1972) views ideology as a method of support for
economic order, a falling into a supportive pattern. Thus, the decline of patriarchy is not the history of monogamy as a reconciliation of relationships but a subjugation of the female sex to maintain a dimension in the economic realm--the division of labor in the
home. But, it is not Engel's technological imperative base which is
the focus of Ogburn. His attention is on the variety of factors
contributing to the decline of family functions.
Status Giving
The family serves to provide status to members which they as
individuals may not have. Ogburn traced changes in domestic relations laws to illustrate the status giving function of the family
as declining. He talked nearly exclusively of the role of women
and changes in laws regulating domicile, income, property and child
custody. He saw these laws, some of which were unjust to his idea,

as focusing attention on individuals. This individualization
combined with other social changes weakened the status giving function of families. He also mentioned geographic mobility and urbanization as weakening features of family loyalties. He noted his
inferences in this area were sketchy.
Changes in sex roles are not evidence of a decline in status
giving functions per se. Intervening variables need attention, such
as the passing of wealth and privilege, or of deprivation, from one
generation to the next in the family which would need to be assessed.
Also, the changes in affectional ties could here be considered.
America, as a nation of immigrants with a sense of manifest destiny,
certainly knew geographic mobility. Ogburn's association of mobility
with his romantic rural bias against urbanization, saw this as a
sign of decline. He did not, however, attempt to measure the
meanings of "community" in the new settings.
Family loyalties are difficult to judge. Perhaps the work of
R. D. Laing (1971, 1972) with schizophrenics indicate that such
loyalties may not be entirely positive. Ivan Boszormenyi-Nagy (1973)
working with troubled families also argues that family loyalties
under considerable stress remain durable. Ogburn's seeing change as
decline may not have captured the dimensions of the issue. The area
of status giving was not highlighted by the writers.
Education
The school teacher may be viewed as a substitute parent with
regard to the function of training the child. The school performs
many of the functions that were once fulfilled by the family. Ogburn
documented the increasing demand for more education by showing
growth in school attendance, increase in numbers of schools, course
work and changing educational demands for employment, also the

average number of days spent in school and measures of the universal
value of education. This array of data from a variety of sources
had shown the loss of educational function of the home to a rapidly
growing educational system of the state.
This trend persists. The average education of the head of
households continues to rise as do the general enrollments. The
state is greatly involved in the education of its people. Growth of
technical education, continuing education and the education of the
very young and the older persons is significant. But has the family
lost its central function of educating its members? Vincent (1967)
thinks not as reflected in a series of questions he asks. Is not
the family seen as the key variable in determining the success of
the failure of the child in education?* Who gets blamed for school
failures? dropouts? Did parents years ago spend as much time,
energy or investments in education as do parents today? Did pioneering families who withdrew children to participate in the labor
force hold more of an educational function than do parents today?
This series of somewhat oversimplified questions points to complications in assessing a decline in family functions in education.
Educational research in the last decades shed more light on the
relationship of the American family and the educational functions
showing the home environment to be critical to the child's development and performance levels. Parent involvement has become a key
figure in the complex question. The perennial turmoil in desegregation shows a positive need for family involvement in policy formulation. Family involvement in education merely by participation
remains high. The loss of this function by the family is unsupported though much change has occurred.
*For example, see the writings of Bronfenbrenner on the ecology of
education (1976).

Religion
Ogburn notes that not only did the family perform religious
activities together but was seen itself as a sacrament in many
religions. His survey of religious mores found a similar decline
in functioning of the family. His data indicated time spent in
prayer at home to be declining, (more so in urban than rural settings), church attendance was also declining as was time spent by
the family in reading the bible. Ogburn noted trends in organized
religion and in the family depicting the loss of this function in
the family.
Again, data is available showing a decline in areas of church
attendance, prayer and religious participation by families but
explanations about the meaning of these changes are not readily
forthcoming. Do these measures effectively get at beliefs or other
basics of religious functioning? Do children maintain the similar
religious beliefs as of their parents? The last several decades
have seen changes in how religious functions are performed but
perhaps these too are adaptive functions. The family may not have
relinquished as much of this area as Ogburn thought. This is in
spite of the manueverings of what some call "churchianity".
The loss of religious functioning by the home has been studied
in various ways. Demographics show a decline in membership of some
churches, such as the Roman Catholic Church, and increases in membership of others, such as the Mormon Church. The increase of participation is difficult to measure--the decline in numbers of priests
and nuns is a form of this decline (Leslie, Larson, Gorman, 1973).
The current infusion of religious dogma into public policies continues. The wedding of fundamentalism and right-wing politics is a
growing phenomenon. How this is related to a decline in family
functioning is the focus of concern and interest.

Recreation
The growth of the creation and amusement industry contribute to
Ogburn's analyses of loss of family control of this function also.
He documented broad growth areas, such as of municipal parks,
athletic clubs, the growth of organized sports, of the motion picture
industry and even industrial recreational expenditures. With this
drawing together of data, he did note also the concomitant growth
of in-home recreation and related home entertainments. He studied
family budgets to determine the recreational outlays.
Vincent (1969) states that just as the family maintains a
central role in economic functions via a consumption role, so it does
in the realm of recreation. He talks of the massive amounts spent
on gadgets, toys, cameras, recreational equipment, etc. ad nauseum.
Today's family produces it's own recreation via consumption. The
growth of leisure business is still a functionally developed area
within, in part, the family.
The role of leisure as it relates to family functions and the
control over leisure seems to be an issue of contemporary significance. Whether leisure gains of working persons is a loss of family
control over them or not is not uniquely defined by Ogburn. This is
an area conceptually vague and unconvincing. For example, is the
recent United Auto Worker's contract with, in effect, a four day
workweek a contribution to family control over leisure? Perhaps a
more critical question is about the impact on other workers, particularily those excluded from the market by virtue of race, age or sex.
The question of the impact of leisure gains on the family and change
is not answered by the methodology employed by Ogburn.
Protective
The protective functions performed by the family are another
area Ogburn developed in his study. In his broadly based focus, he

looked at various areas where the protective functions were taken
over by other institutions, such as in health; care of the aged,
youth, ill and retarded; and also in studies of families in crisis.
This loss of functions was seen as further decline in the family.
Health is the first area Ogburn studied to demonstrate his
theory. He documented the growth of environmental health, sanitation and also public health services. He documented the growth and
expansion of hospitals and other medical services. This data was
precursory to the phenomenal growth of public and private health outlays of the decades that followed the virginal study. The current
issue of health is of interest to most. The 1975 National Conference
of Social Welfare discussed seven root causes of the current health
care crisis:
1. absence of a national health policy
2. runaway costs (in 1974,$10.4 Billion, 7.7% of the GNP)
3. lack of access
4. fragmental organization of services
S. inadequate quality of care
6. private insurance failure of cost containment and meeting
needs
7. the interrelationship of the above factors (Glasser, 1975).
Concern over health issues is clearly a public issue, one of which
other social institutions have garnered considerable influence.
Public policy reflects in part the fear of what some consider overcommitment by the public. There is no question of the astounding
costs sky-rocketing, though whether this is at the expense of family
control is less clear.
The protection of the aged took a dramatic turn about the time
of the 1933 report in the passage of the Social Security Act. This
came in hand with other features of the welfare state. The family
is no longer seen as sole guardian of its member's interests. The

debate of whether the welfare state expedites the decline of the
family's functions continues both in academia and in politics in
general. The growth of the welfare state is seen by some as concomitant to the decline of the family (Briggs, 1967).
Ogburn also delineated other protective functions of the family
diminished by the welfare state. He talked about the protection of
the mentally ill, the retarded, and the abused. He saw the state
taking over more and more areas which the family had formerly
controlled. The question of how well the family traditionally took
care of such issues is one not addressed. Thus, change over a time
is not addressed and hence support for the idea of decline is vague.
It is by increasing support for the family by the state in the provision of a range of services (to the abused, neglected, handicapped,
the vulnerable) that this will enhance the protective capacity of
the family, though altered from an individualist approach. This is
particularly relevant when in-home supportive services such as homemaker, chore services, home-health care, or counseling services are
considered. Also, is the issue of deinstitutionalization a return
of such functions to the family?
Challenges to this decline are found in the research of social
networks (Litwack, 1969; Sussman, Burchinal, 1969).
These demonstrate that when in stress, the extended family meets the needs of
what some have labeled an isolated nuclear family. Also, children's
advocates see the decline in family control by increased state intervention in protective functions as a move toward children's overall
protection (Steiner, 1976). The public demand for services, such
as found in Title XX, for state protection of the neglected and abused,
and in the range of other services to the exploited and the vulnerable, argues in a sense for the acceptance of the state's interventions in areas where the family perhaps fails in its protective
functions.

Growth in the state's involvement in the protective function
may support Ogburn's idea of decline or it may more likely reflect
changes which demand more of the protective function within the
family. A change in the character of the function is not a decline
in the protective function hut by community pressure, an enhancement
of this family function. Ogburn's analysis raised important policy
issues, though his conclusions call for reinterpretation.
Affection
The only family function Ogburn felt grew as a result of changes
in the family was the area of affectional ties. If for no other
reason than due to the decline of the other functions, the personality functions have taken on a greater significance. The rearing of
children and securing happiness are of much greater emphasis.
In a
later work, Ogburn and Nimkbff (1955) develop a historical pattern
from the more functionally diverse role to the current personality
oriented family. In earlier times, religion, family background,
race, status and economic functions were far more important than
after the decline of the extended family.
Seward (1978) states that this is a shift which is romantically
accepted but is historically fictitious. He notes that the romantic
shift is not found in the data he studied. He studied census data,
songs, letters, magazines, newspapers and in these he found no
evidence of this shift. Morgan (1969) also notes this in his discussion of the Puritans.
Summary
Ogburn's "The Family And Its Functions" has been a major contribution to the study of the family, social change, and the use of
sociological data to understand the events in life which we share in.
Critics have strongly questioned the accuracy and the validity of

his data but the monumental methodological contribution continues to
provide rich insights. Ogburn did not, as did some of his contemporaries, most notably Zimmerman (1947), decry the decay and impending
disaster because of the changes in the family. However, neither did
he foresee that change was perhaps a positive indication of adaptation. This review can provide a format for viewing the continued
changes and be used as a background for the analysis and development of a family policy. An understanding of functional changes in
the family is helpful before interventions are advanced.
Further Trends and Comments
Continued insights are gained about the current functions of
the family. The earlier extended family was very limited to conditions of wealth and certain religions by a host of features.
History has shown over time a continuity in the cultures of American
families. This is documented in the basically unchanged patterns
in the membership sizes of the family (slight decrease), ages of
members, sex composition, generational composition, number of
marital pairs and number of siblings. This trend is as, documented
in Here To Stay by Banes (1976). The folowing data is from Seward
(1978: pages 79, 88, 92, 163, 166, 167, 169).
Size of Household and Family
Percentage of Families with No
Year Household Family
Subfamilies
1774
6.14
5.61
Year
No Subfamilies
1880
5.04
4.83
1850
98.1%
1930
4.11
-1880
96.0%
1950
3.39
3.54
1960
96.8%
1960
3.33
3.65
1970
97.6%
1970
3.07
3.57

Percentage of Marital
Sex of Head
Number of Head's
Pairs Per Family
of Family
Own Children
Year Marital Pairs
Year Male Female
Year Mean Number
1850
86%
1850 91.1%
8.9%
1850
2.76
1880
89%
1880 89.8% 10.1%
1880
2.70
1950
91%
1950 90.7%
9.3%
1950
1.15
1960
90%
1960 90.7%
9.3%
1960
1.34
1970
87%
1970 89.2% 10.8%
1970
1.30
This data does not support the assumptions of considerable
changes in the family over the course of American history brought on
by the industrial revolution and combined technological innovations.
The number of children seems to have decreased but part of this is
the product of larger numbers of couples in older ages. This life
expectance data illustrates this impact (Leslie, Larson, Gorman,
1973: 367):
Life Expectancy
Sex
Color
Year Total Male Female
White
Nonwhite
1900
47.3 46.3
48.3
47.6
33.0
1930
59.7 58.1
61.6
61.4
48.1
1950
68.2 65.7
71.3
69.1
60.8
1960
69.7 66.6
73.1
70.6
63.6
1967
70.5 67.0
74.2
71.3
64.6
The data does not verify large changes in the family throughout
American history on which Ogburn based his theory. When changes
are discussed and family policy analyzed, this moderation is critical
to a proper perspective on family policy.
Ogburn and others talk of features of disorganization of the
family. Ogburn cites causes rooted in the loss of family functions.
Leontine Young (1973) talks of the collapse of the family based on
an overall assessment of rapid change brought on by similar reasons--

that the family has lost its power and direction. She laments the
decline of the role of motherhood and the general commitment decline
of members to each other. She sees childless families as lacking
permanence and commitment. She talks of families as a bastion
against emptiness, loneliness and rootlessness in mass society: a
family in decline!
Individuals with concern about the state of the family see
change as symbolic of social disorganization. The figures on divorce
are frequently brought to bear to portray this scenario. Divorces
are certainly ideologically more acceptable and in most states
legally easier to obtain. A prominant concern is what happens to
the children whose parents divorce. Of the children born in the
1970's, 45% lived with a single parent for some of their life.
What is the nature of the intrapsychic distress caused by divorce on
children and what does this disequilibrium do? And what of the readjustment problems of blended families? Between 1966 and 1976, the
rate of divorce in the United States increased by 113%. Whereas in
1966 one divorce was granted for every four marriages performed, by
1976 the ratio had changed to one divorce for every two marriages.
Nearly one million divorces a year can now be expected (Wallerstein,
Kelly, 1979).
Leslie (1971) talks about the problems in coming to conclusions
about the breakdown of the family and using divorce statistics in
this discussion. He feels it difficult to predict trends given the
cyclical nature of the phenomenon. He also talks of the significance
of the rates of remarriage figures called serial monogomy by some.
Two figures which provide a meaningful overview and provide credence
to this moderating effect are cited by Dyer (1979). The percentage
of persons married throughout the twentieth century in the United
States has been continuously increasing, from about 55% in the early
part to more currently about 75%, with slight differences between

males and females. Also, the rates of which persons marry has remained stable throughout this century. This would indicate that
marriage is considerably more stable than the view which divorce
rates suggest.
Many of the features which illustrate concern in the decline
of the family are offset by related statistics. Two examples are
here offered. A concern is often expressed by the increase in the
number of teenage pregnancies. While the numbers of pregnancies of
older teens is decreasing, the number of pregnancies of younger teens
is increasing (Chilman, 1969).
This is somewhat balanced by the
fact that in 1950 the average age at marriage was 21 and it was 23
in 1973. High mobility (geographic) rates are also seen as a sign
of disorganization of the family. For example, the military has
attempted to minimize stress in moving their families. While nearly
20% of the population changes addresses every year, this figure has
not increased the last several decades. The peak remains with that
portion of the population which would be expected--persons in their
early twenties (Barabba, 1973). What appears evident in prediction
of trends is that alarming statistics of family instability reflect
the attitudinal frame of which they are presented as much as they
do a theoretical force in themselves. It is for this reason that a
context of which one operates has important implications for family
policy.
Conclusion
This review questions the trends cited as a decline in the
family. Though social change is pervasive, it is not ominous.
Family policy needs to be explored in light of anticipated resource
exchanges; changes in allocations, rights and deprivations; and in
changes in the overall social quality of life (Gil, 1976).
The
utilization of the social sciences in the formulation of family

policy can play a meaningful role but the wisdon of policy needs to
be moderate, tentative in its alternative approaches, tolerant of
diversity and not all-inclusive.
Family policy can be an unmanageable and potentially dangerous
concept with significant potential for individual denigration
(Barbaro, 1979).
Entering family policy into the political arena
can potentially advance narrow interests. The evidence of family
study and social change does not support a family policy which is
based on fears of a rapidly declining institution buffeted by
change and disorganization. The measures of a humane society are
challanged by the concept of a family policy but not from the
evidence of the loss of family functions. Social change and change
in functions have occured. The strain on families in this interactive context calls for policies to support families enhance their
functioning and strengthen individual members. The caring functions
need buttressing. Social change has not seen the family in perilous
decline and the need for family policies estranged from narrow interests calls for active support.
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